Nietzschian Morality
In reading one of Nietzsche’s masterpieces Twilight of the Idols: or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer, I have found some things disturbing that conflict with my own personal philosophy (if I may use the word of the ages in that sense). He states:
My demand upon the philosopher is known, that he take his stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgment beneath himself. This demand follows from an insight which I was the first to formulate: that there are altogether no moral facts. Moral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities. Morality is merely an interpretation of certain phenomena—more precisely, a misinterpretation. Moral judgments, like religious ones, belong to a stage of ignorance at which the very concept of the real, and the distinction between what is real and imaginary, are still lacking: thus "truth," at this stage, designates all sorts of things which we today call "imaginings." Moral judgments are therefore never to be taken literally: so understood, they always contain mere absurdity. Semeiotically, however, they remain invaluable: they reveal, at least for those who know, the most valuable realities of cultures and inwardnesses which did not know enough to "understand" themselves. Morality is mere sign language, mere symptomatology: one must know what it is all about to be able to profit from it.
(taken from The Nietzsche Channel, http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel
/twi.htm) Published 1889Based on the translation by Walter KaufmannText amended in part by The Nietzsche Channel.
If there is any problem in reprinting this text on my blog, please alert me, and it shall be removed.
I fear that Nietzsche has missed the point of morality, and by this time he was under a year from his infamous mental breakdown. It appears that Nietzsche has missed the fundamental point of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which is my God, de facto. He has no sense of morality for morality’s sake. It is possible that Nietzsche associates all ethics with religion, and sees no reason for morality once God has died. But that is to miss the point of the functioning society, and even to undermine one’s own conscience. He refutes morality to begin with, but on what basis? What Nietzsche is saying, I believe, is that we ought not to look for a human code of ethics, but more to examine how we treat each other, but not to judge them. However, to examine and not to judge is to be a historical sociologist. It is to look at the past, but not do anything about the future. I am not for being above good and evil, and I think Nietzsche errs in this fact.
Nietzsche’s flaw is he doesn’t seem to comprehend a morality system that isn’t based in punishment. The Christian morality system is, especially at that time, based on a punishment system. He saw that the fear of damnation made one act a certain way; it is important to note that the punishment of hell outweighed the reward of heaven. I think that Nietzsche either didn’t grasp or refuted being moral for morality’s sake. It’s this conception of morality that I believe is flawed.
A major point to my credit the concept of conscious guilt. Nietzsche is attempting to argue that morality is a social (and religious) construct, and it is relativistic. I argue that while the exact code differs among cultures, there is still the concept of inner guilt that no one is beyond. It is the fact that we have the capacity to reevaluate our decisions, and that we are programmed with guilty consciences shows that morality is not a fabrication. We must be moral; we want to be moral! Nietzsche went to far in his reevaluation in values by discounting morality itself, and I am not one to stand by and allow this. To ignore morality is to ignore human nature, and the inner desire to do what is right. Nietzsche had "had it up to here” with Christianity, but he associated all morality with religiosity which is a mistake. You cannot rise above the herd if you do not realize any sort of contact of action. Even Nietzsche isn’t above the categorical imperative, and my immense admiration and respect for him still exists, but morality is an entity unto itself, not a piteous human construct.
My demand upon the philosopher is known, that he take his stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgment beneath himself. This demand follows from an insight which I was the first to formulate: that there are altogether no moral facts. Moral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities. Morality is merely an interpretation of certain phenomena—more precisely, a misinterpretation. Moral judgments, like religious ones, belong to a stage of ignorance at which the very concept of the real, and the distinction between what is real and imaginary, are still lacking: thus "truth," at this stage, designates all sorts of things which we today call "imaginings." Moral judgments are therefore never to be taken literally: so understood, they always contain mere absurdity. Semeiotically, however, they remain invaluable: they reveal, at least for those who know, the most valuable realities of cultures and inwardnesses which did not know enough to "understand" themselves. Morality is mere sign language, mere symptomatology: one must know what it is all about to be able to profit from it.
(taken from The Nietzsche Channel, http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel
/twi.htm) Published 1889Based on the translation by Walter KaufmannText amended in part by The Nietzsche Channel.
If there is any problem in reprinting this text on my blog, please alert me, and it shall be removed.
I fear that Nietzsche has missed the point of morality, and by this time he was under a year from his infamous mental breakdown. It appears that Nietzsche has missed the fundamental point of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which is my God, de facto. He has no sense of morality for morality’s sake. It is possible that Nietzsche associates all ethics with religion, and sees no reason for morality once God has died. But that is to miss the point of the functioning society, and even to undermine one’s own conscience. He refutes morality to begin with, but on what basis? What Nietzsche is saying, I believe, is that we ought not to look for a human code of ethics, but more to examine how we treat each other, but not to judge them. However, to examine and not to judge is to be a historical sociologist. It is to look at the past, but not do anything about the future. I am not for being above good and evil, and I think Nietzsche errs in this fact.
Nietzsche’s flaw is he doesn’t seem to comprehend a morality system that isn’t based in punishment. The Christian morality system is, especially at that time, based on a punishment system. He saw that the fear of damnation made one act a certain way; it is important to note that the punishment of hell outweighed the reward of heaven. I think that Nietzsche either didn’t grasp or refuted being moral for morality’s sake. It’s this conception of morality that I believe is flawed.
A major point to my credit the concept of conscious guilt. Nietzsche is attempting to argue that morality is a social (and religious) construct, and it is relativistic. I argue that while the exact code differs among cultures, there is still the concept of inner guilt that no one is beyond. It is the fact that we have the capacity to reevaluate our decisions, and that we are programmed with guilty consciences shows that morality is not a fabrication. We must be moral; we want to be moral! Nietzsche went to far in his reevaluation in values by discounting morality itself, and I am not one to stand by and allow this. To ignore morality is to ignore human nature, and the inner desire to do what is right. Nietzsche had "had it up to here” with Christianity, but he associated all morality with religiosity which is a mistake. You cannot rise above the herd if you do not realize any sort of contact of action. Even Nietzsche isn’t above the categorical imperative, and my immense admiration and respect for him still exists, but morality is an entity unto itself, not a piteous human construct.
posted by Brian Hillman at 2:08 PM
1 Comments:
The fact that there is a conscience at all implies higher being because conscience does not fit within the ideal of "survival of the fittest".
In fact if survival of the fittest is indeed correct, there is no need whatsoever for morality. Only preserve what is mine and those who benifit me and my progeny. Otherwise, what in nature justifies compassion? Does a male lion pardon the presence of another male lion because he is a friend? No. In fact if it threatens his own livelyhood he will drive away his own son or kill it if necessary.
With this logic, in fact white supremacy is the correct mentality to assume. For what better way to propagate evolution than to eliminate the sick, the poor, the unsightly. Why allow poverty to exist? These countries are obviously not evolved enough to govern even themselves.
I AM NOT A RACIST. I AM NEITHER OF CAUCASION ANCESTORY.
The fundamental ideals of Neitche ar flawed in that they are based around the belief that there is no creator. How can I say this?
The most basic functions of a human cell: digestion, the excretion of waste, the transport of nutrients, the porousness and water repelent qualities of a cell's "Skin" are all performed by individual mechanisms which had to develop all at the same time. Yet if one of these functions did not exist, the cell would die.
Evolution is a theory and a flawed one.
Compassion, love, hatred, forethought, language, these things are not necessary to exist. Functioning by instinct would be sufficient. There is no need to evolve beyond that. There is no benifit to it in regards to survival. So long as I can recognize what is beneficial to myself and my progeny, I need no emotion because I will do what is necessary to propagate my genes.
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